This paper analyzes the intertemporal choice foundations underlying the conservation or extinction of renewable resources when the resource production function is non-concave and the immediate return function depends on both current consumption and the size of the resource stock. This case may exhibit nonlinear dynamics and extinction is possible from high stocks even if conservation occurs from lower stocks. The paper focusses on the influence of preferences and the production function on the efficiency of: global conservation, the existence of a safe standard of conservation, or extinction. We show that conservation is efficient under weaker conditions than the "6-productivity" requirements derived in models where return function is not stock-dependent. The marginal rate of substitution between investment and the stock plays an important role in addition to the discount factor and the marginal productivity of the resource. Extinction need not be optimal even if the intrinsic growth rate of the resource is less than the external rate of return. Our analysis demonstrates the potential role of taxes, subsidies, demand forces, and harvest costs in determining the efficiency of conservation or extinction.
Introduction
There are two important reasons why renewable resources can be harvested in a fashion that leads to their extinction. The first arises from the fact that such resources are harvested under open access conditions. The associated common property externalities may cause serious over-exploitation (Berck (1979) ). 1 The second reason extinction may occur is purely capital theoretic. Even if a resource is managed by a single agent whose objective is intertemporal efficiency, the preferences of the agent and the ecology of the resource may be such that an efficient policy is one that leads to extinction. In this paper, we focus on this second aspect, that is, under what conditions does optimal intertemporal allocation lead to conservation or extinction of a resource.
We consider a discrete time model of a renewable resource whose harvest yields an immediate return (or utility) that depends on both current consumption and the size of the resource stock.2 Such stock-dependence is important whenever the resource stock influences harvest costs. Growth in the resource stock is governed by an S-shaped natural production function that allows for increasing growth rates when the stock is low, but diminishing growth rates as the stock approaches the natural carrying capacity of the environment. The agent in our model can represent a private monopolist, a social welfare maximizer, or a set of atomistic producers in a perfectly competitive industry. In the absence of externalities and in a partial equilibrium setting, the perfectly competitive outcome is identical to that determined by a social planner maximizing the discounted sum of producer and consumer surplus over time (Levhari, Michener, and Mirman (1981) ). Alternatively, the model is equivalent to a classical optimal growth model, with more general assumptions on both utility and production. The classical growth model is based on a concave production function and a utility function that is independent of the stock. The primary concern of the classical 1This need not always be true (see, e.g., Dutta and Sundaram (1993) ).
2In continuous time, the problem of resource extinction has been analyzed by Clark (1971 Clark ( , 1973 ; Lewis and Schmalensee (1977) ; Skiba (1978) ; Cropper, Lee, and Pannu (1979); and Cropper (1988) , among others. growth literature involves issues other than conservation. In fact, it is common to impose assumptions that are specifically designed to rule out extinction as a possibility. Clark (1971 Clark ( , 1973 was the first to examine the problem of extinction with nonconcave production under the assumption of a linear, stock-independent utility function. He showed that the efficiency of extinction or conservation depends on the discounted marginal productivity of the resource. He also conjectured the existence of a safe standard of conservation if the discount rate is less than the intrinsic growth rate of the resource, but greater than the maximum average productivity. The existence of such a critical stock was proved by Mitra (1982, 1983 ) and characterized more completely by Dechert and Nishimura (1983) . An algorithm to calculate the critical stock is given in Anant and Sharma (1985) for the linear utility case considered by Clark. Dechert and Nishimura (1983) provide a fairly complete characterization of optimal resource allocation policies for the stock-independent model. Their analysis shows that optimal resource investment is an increasing function of the current stock so that optimal resource stocks converge to a steady state over time. Amir, Mirman and Perkins (1991) interpret this monotonicity property as a second-order condition for local optimality. In these stock-independent models, the significant implications of nonconcave production are: (i) the possible existence of a critical stock or safe standard of conservation; (ii) the optimal policy may not be continuous; and, (Hi) optimal consumption may be a non-monotone function of the resource stock. The discount rate and the marginal growth rate of the resource are the primary determinants of the efficiency of conservation or extinction and the return function plays an insignificant role in determining the ultimate fate of the resource.
The optimal growth problem with concave production and stock-dependent return was first considered by Kurz (1968) . He showed that stock-dependence introduces the possibility of multiple optimal steady states where in the classical model there is at most one. Levhari, Michener, .and Mirman (1981) discuss similar results in the context of renewable resources. Majumdar and Mitra (1991) show that stock-dependence can create striking departures from classical behavior by making it possible for optimal programs to exhibit periodic or chaotic behavior over time.
Our analysis of conservation and extinction attempts to account for the joint implications of nonconcave production and the fact that immediate returns depend on the resource stock. When the production function is non-concave, conservation and extinction are not global properties. When the return function is stock-dependent, optimal programs can exhibit cycles or chaos and a safe standard of conservation may not exist. Together, non-concave production and stock-dependent returns substantially enlarge the range of possibilities for conservation and extinction when compared with traditional models.
In this paper we show that the efficiency of conservation or extinction depends on more than the relation between the discount rate and the natural growth rate of the species. We show that conservation is efficient even if the discount rate exceeds the natural growth rate everywhere, provided the stock-effect on returns is strong enough. Unlike models with a stock-independent return, demand and cost influences can play a crucial role in determining the fate of optimally managed resources and resource conservation is efficient under less stringent restrictions. This suggests that the possibility of extinction for optimally managed resources may be less of a concern than previously presumed. Further, in our framework there is a means by which direct policy intervention can influence the conservation of a species by a single private owner or a perfectly competitive market (through taxes on consumer surplus). This was not possible in earlier models. Finally, our analysis can accommodate the possibility that there is direct social payoff from preservation of species. This allows one to examine what kind of social consciousness is needed for conservation of a species to be efficient, given a production function and discount rate.
The paper is organized as follows. The formal model is presented in Section 2 along with some preliminary lemmas. These focus on the Ramsey-Euler equation, the interiority of optimal allocations, and monotonicity results. Section 3 defines the different types of conservation and extinction considered in this paper and it provides an explicit example that illustrates the complex set of possibilities that may emerge. Section 4 examines the conditions under which there exists a safe standard of conservation, while 
The Model and Preliminary Results
At each date there is a renewable resource stock, ytE R+, from which an agent harvests and consumes, ct. Investment in future resource stocks (or escapement) is denoted xt = yt-ct. The resource stock in period t+1 is determined by a production or stock-recruitment function, f:R+-3 , 11k+, where yt+1 = f(xt). Economic returns in each period are denoted R(c,y). Given an initial resource stock, yo > 0, the agent chooses resource consumption and investment to maximize the discounted sum of returns over time. The value function for this problem is given by: program. An optimal program such that 0 < ct < yt for all t is said to be an interior optimal program. The set of all optimal resource investments from yo defines an optimal investment policy correspondence X(y) = {x:x=x0 for some optimal program {ct,xt,yt } t>0 from yo = y). The optimal consumption policy correspondence is defined by C(y) = {y-x:x E X(y)}.
Throughout the paper we impose the following assumptions on f: (ii) V is continuous and nondecreasing.
(iii) V(y) > -00 for all y>0.
3Here the assumption that K is unique imposes no loss in generality.
(iv) The optimal policy correspondences X(y) and C(y) are upper hemicontinuous.
(v) If {ct,yt ) is an optimal program, then c < ct implies R(c,yt ) R(coyt), or Rc(ct,yt ) 0; i.e., myopic agents overexploit the resource relative to the optimum.
We begin our analysis with two lemmas.
Lemma 2.1. Let ict,xt,ydt , 0 be an optimal program. . is a supermodular function on the set {(x,y): (y-x,y) E PO (see Topkis(1978) , section 3). Under (R.7), 0 is strictly supermodular. The economic interpretation of (R.6) or (R.7) is that an increase in the current resource stock raises the marginal value of investment in future stocks. Under this type of complementarity optimal investment satisfies the following monotonicity property. Nyarko and Olson (1991) . Define the minimum and maximum selections from X(y) by X(y) = min{x:x E X(y)} and R(y) = max{x:x E X(y)}. Lemma 2.3 has the following corollary.
Corollary to Lemma 2.3. Under (R.6), X(y) and X(y) are nondecreasing in y.
Define { t,Lct,yth,o by = X(yt), = yt±i = f(xt), where yo > 0 is given. This is the optimal program obtained by following X() in each period, i.e., xt = Xt(f(l0)). Similarly, define {c t, x t, y t } to be the optimal program obtained by following RO in each period. The Corollary to Lemma 2.3 implies that these optimal programs are monotonic over time.
Lemma 2.4. Assume (R.6). Then either xt xt+1 and it yt+i for all t, or xt xt±i and yt > it+i for all t. Similarly, either 7t 7t+1 for all t, or x t x t+1 for all t.
The investment sequences {xt } and {it } provide lower and upper bounds on the sequence of optimal resource stocks and investments along any optimal program from yo.
Lemma 2.5. Assume (R.6). If (ct,xt,yd is an optimal program then x t xt xt and y t yt yt for all t.
Lemma 2.4 can be sharpened when the immediate return function is strictly supermodular and optimal programs are interior.
Lemma 2.6. Let {ct,xt,yd and (ct',xt ',0 be any two optimal programs from yo > yo ' > 0, respectively.
If (R.7) holds then, xo x0'. In addition, if co > 0, c1 > 0, co ' > 0 and c1 ' > 0, then x0 > x0'.4
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2.6 is that when the immediate return is strictly supermodular, interior optimal programs of resource stocks and investment are either stationary or strictly monotonic over time.
Corollary to Lemma 2.6. Assume (R. (R.7) holds then every interior optimal program converges monotonically to an optimal steady state.
4In the case of convex technology (with a unique optimum) one can replace strict supermodularity by its weak form and obtain the result that yo > yo ' implies xo xo ' and xt xt', as in Nyarko and Olson (1991) . 5Steady states need not be optimal, but an optimal stationary program is equivalent to an optimal steady state.
It is readily apparent that both the existence and stability of optimal steady states can be important for the conservation or extinction of the resource. The next section highlights the different possibilities.
Conservation Considered
There are significant possibilities for conservation and extinction that only arise under the combination of stock-dependent return and non-concave production. These can best be illustrated by considering a concrete example.
Example 3.1. Let the resource growth function be:
This growth function is continuously differentiable and non-concave with an inflection point at x = 0.3.
The stock is normalized so that x = 1 represents the natural carrying capacity, and the intrinsic growth rate is f'(0)-1 = 0.1.
For convenience, the discount factor is expressed as (5 = 1/(1+p), where p is the discount rate. the current stock and investment in future stocks. Under this condition Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) have shown that optimal resource investment is decreasing in the stock on the interior of P and interior optimal programs exhibit cycles. More recently it has been demonstrated that submodularity is inconsistent with the Inada condition so, in general, one cannot guarantee that optimal programs are always interior. When noninterior programs are allowed, optimal investment may be increasing for some intervals of the resource stock and optimally managed stocks may exhibit complex or chaotic dynamics (Majumdar and Mitra (1994) and Nishimura and Yano (1995) ).
The implications for resource conservation can be seen in Figures 1-3 . These show the optimal stock policies for low (p = 0.1), intermediate (p = 0.45), and higher (p = 0.47) discounting, where p = 10.0, a = 1.0, and 3 = 1.0.6 With low discounting, an optimal program from low stocks involves a moratorium on harvests until stocks are sufficiently large. Beyond this point the optimal program converges along strongly damped cycles to a positive optimal steady state. Extinction never occurs from any initial stock. With intermediate discounting the optimal policy from low stocks is to immediately harvest the resource to extinction. There is a critical stock or safe standard of conservation such that extinction is efficient for small stocks, but conservation is efficient from larger stocks. Figure 3 illustrates one important feature of the problem that is specific to a model that allows for both stock-dependent return and non-concave production. Extinction is efficient from both low and high stocks, while conservation is efficient from intermediate stocks. There is no critical stock such that from larger stocks conservation is always guaranteed. In fact, the set of stocks from which conservation is efficient may become arbitrarily small as the discount rate increases. The behavior in this example stems from 2 basic facts. The first is that with nonconcave production there can be extinction from low stocks. The second is that when the return function is submodular an increase in the current stock lowers the marginal value of investing in future stocks. Thus, the optimal response to a larger stock is to invest less (or a corner solution). When the rate of time preference increases, the incentives to investment become even smaller. As the example shows, incentives for investment from large stocks may become so low that the future stock is in the region of extinction from small stocks, in which case it is optimal to harvest the entire stock immediately.
In this paper we focus on the existence of a safe standard of conservation, global conservation, and the possibility of extinction.
6The solutions are obtained via numerical methods using the method of successive approximations.
Definition. A safe standard of conservation exists if there exists 13 > 0 such that if yt is an optimal program from yo 0, then inifyj > 0.
The term safe standard of conservation is adapted from Clark (1971) . It refers to a stock, 0, such that if the initial stock exceeds 0, then conservation of the resource is efficient; while survival of the resource cannot be guaranteed if the stock is less than 0. If the resource stock falls below the safe standard of conservation then the economic survival of the resource could be promoted by modifying the structure of the resource management problem through policies directed toward the immediate reward function (e.g. through taxation) or the biological production function (through artificial enhancement), or by a restriction or ban on harvests if the stock falls too low.
Global conservation occurs if the most consumptive optimal policy from any strictly positive stock fails to drive the stock to extinction.
Definition. Global conservation is efficient if inf (yd > 0 for every optimal program of resource stock (yd from any yo > 0.
If there is no safe standard of conservation then it must be the case that for any Y > 0, there exists a y > Y such that extinction is efficient from y. This does not mean that conservation is never efficient. As seen in Figure 3 , there may be alternating intervals of conservation and extinction. It may be economically efficient to harvest the resource to extinction from both low stocks and high stocks, with conservation being efficient only from some intermediate stock levels. On the other hand, if conservation is inefficient from all stocks then one has:
Definition. Global extinction is efficient if limsupt " yt = 0 along every optimal program.
In this case the economic considerations of the agent exploiting the resource do not justify preservation.
Conservation must be defended on other grounds, or policy instruments described above could be used to promote survival of the resource.
Existence of A Safe Standard of Conservation
In this section, we establish conditions that ensure the existence of a safe standard of conservation.
With stock-dependence, the conditions for a safe standard of conservation ought to involve the return function in an essential way. This is evident from the fact that a strictly positive steady state satisfies:
of ( In this subsection, we examine the existence of a safe standard of conservation when (R.6) holds and the immediate return function exhibits complementarity between current stocks and investment in future stocks. Under (R.6), Lemmas 2.4 -2.7 imply that a safe standard of conservation exists if and only if there is a stock y > 0 such that {it } is an optimal stationary program from y. In models where the return function is stock-independent it is well known that such a program exists if the production function is 6-productive, i.e., if there is some stock x > 0 for which of(x) x (see Dechert and Nishimura (1983) or Mitra and Ray (1984) ). In the stock-independent case the 6-productivity condition arises naturally from the decentralized version of the resource allocation problem, where its primary role is to satisfy Slater's constraint qualification.7 In problems where the immediate return function is important decentralized methods involve undesirable restrictions since neither Slater's condition nor most of the classical constraint qualifications allow a role for the objective function. For example, in our framework it is easy to construct examples where there are non-trivial optimal steady states but 6-productivity is violated. Thus, we take a direct approach that allows the return function to play an essential role in proving the existence of an optimal stationary program. 
Then there exists a strictly positive optimal steady state and y' = fix') is a safe standard of conservation. [f(x*)/x1x, 0 x < x*,
F is concave and satisfies (T.1)-(T.4). Consider the (modified) dynamic optimization problem where F replaces f and everything else stays the same. This is a convex problem. Let W be the value function for this modified problem. By standard arguments W is concave and is differentiable at any point y > 0 7For this reason methods based on 6-productivity are predominant even in the literature on the existence of optimal steady states in multi-sector growth models (e.g., McKenzie (1986) ). An exception is Khan and Mitra (1986) who note that there is a direct payoff to a primal approach that dispenses with the need for Slater's constraint qualification. Instead, they require that the technology be 6-normal, but this reduces to 6-productivity in our framework.
where the optimal consumption, say c, is strictly positive and, in that case, W'(y) = [Re(c,y) + Ry(c,y)].
Let H(y) = minfx:x is optimal from y in the modified problem). H(y) is nondecreasing under (R.6).
By definition F(x) f(x) for all x 0, so that a feasible program in the original problem is also feasible in the modified problem (from any yo). Let {yt,xt,ct } be the optimal program in the modified problem generated by investing H(y) in each period. If this program is such that yt f(x* ) for all t 0, then it is feasible in the original problem and it must be equivalent to the optimal program generated by investing X(y) in every period. To see this note that if there is some optimal program in the original problem where xt < H(y) then this program must have the same discounted sum of returns as the program generated by H() and so must be optimal in the modified problem; but this violates the definition of H().
Now take x' as in the theorem and suppose c' is optimal from F(x') and satisfies c' > F(x')-x' > 0. Then W is differentiable at F(x'). The condition of(
Hence, by concavity of W, the optimal investment from initial stock F(f) is at least as large as x', contradicting c' > F(x')-x'. In this case set ye = F(x').
By the monotonicity of HO, optimal stocks from ye are all bounded below by ye f(x*). This program is a lower bound on any optimal program in the original problem, so it must be true that for all optimal programs from yo > ye, extinction does not occur.
(b) Suppose there exists some x E (0,K) such that Re(f(x)-x,f(x)) < 0. It is clear that starting from f(x) the agent will never consume more than f(x)-x, so that next period's stock is at least as large as f(x). The proof follows from the monotonicity of X(y) and in this case ye = f(x). // Note that this theorem does not require the interiority of optimal policies. Further, if the immediate return function is independent of the stock level, then Theorem 4.1.a reduces to the familiar "(5-productivity" result in the existing literature.8 8If f is S-shaped (i.e. y > 0, x* > 0) 6-productivity is equivalent to the requirement that 6f(x*) 1; if f is strictly concave (i.e. 7 = x* = 0) it is equivalent to the requirement that 6f1 (0) > 1.
4.ii. Existence of a Safe Standard of Conservation: The General Case.
We now consider the possibilities for conservation of the resource when (R.6) is relaxed and the return function 0(x,y) is not necessarily supermodular in x and y. As noted earlier, this allows for the possibility of optimal stock and investment programs that are nonmonotonic and nonconvergent over time.
The loss of monotonicity renders the task of establishing results on a safe standard of conservation more difficult. As illustrated in Section 3, the fact that extinction does not occur from some stock level does not necessarily imply the existence of a safe standard of conservation. One must show specifically that extinction does not occur from any higher stock. Not surprisingly, therefore, stronger conditions are required to obtain conservation as an efficient outcome.
The following notation is useful. For any (x,y) such that 0 < x < y define Choose any yo f(x') = F(x'). We will show that xo = H(yo) x'. If Rc(y0-x',y0 ) 0 it cannot be optimal to invest less than x', even for a myopic agent. If Rc(yo-x',yo) > 0 and 6f(x')(1+s(yo,x')) 1, then oF'(x')(1+s(yo,x')) 1. Suppose xo < x'. Then F(x0 ) F'(x') and yo-x' < yo -xo with the latter implying Rc(yo-x',yo) > 0. Let y1 = F(x0). Using (4.2) one obtains:
W'(yo) = Re(c0,y0 ) + Ry (co,y0 )
Since [1 + s(y0,x')]6F1 (x') 1, it follows that W 1 (y0 ) W1 (y1). This implies y1 yo so that F(x0 ) Yo F(x') which contradicts xo < x'. By induction, if yo f(x') = F(x'), the optimal stocks yt generated by H are bounded below by y' = F(x') for all t. holds not even a myopic agent will consume beyond the amount needed to regenerate the current stock.
The fundamental conclusion is that, regardless of the stock dynamics, the conditions under which a safe standard of conservation is efficient are weaker when the immediate return function depends on the stock as opposed to the stock-independent case. In particular, a safe standard of conservation may be optimal even when the natural growth rate of the resource is always less than the discount rate. The strength of the stock-effect on immediate return vis-a-vis that of immediate consumption, is crucial in determining the efficiency of conservation.
Global Conservation
In this section, we discuss conditions under which conservation of the resource is optimal from all positive initial stocks. When the return function is stock-independent, global conservation is efficient if and only if the production function is 6-productive at zero, that is, if and only if there exists some € > such that of(x) x for all x E (0,€) (Dechert and Nishimura (1983) ). This is equivalent to 5f' (0) > 1 if f is S-shaped (i.e. > 0) and or(0) > 1 if f is strictly concave (i.e. y = 0). In Section 4 we have seen that if one allows for stock-dependence then the welfare effect from investment in the stock may lead to conservation even if the technology is not 6-productive anywhere. By analogy, it is natural to conjecture that the efficiency of global conservation should depend on both the intrinsic productivity of the resource and the intrinsic welfare effect of investment, where intrinsic refers to behavior in a neighborhood of zero.
Global Conservation with Complementarity Between Current and Future Stocks
We first examine the economic efficiency of global conservation under (R.6). Intuition suggests that complementarity between the current stock and investment in future stocks ought to enhance the efficiency of conservation and reduce the possibility of extinction as it places a higher marginal value on large stock sizes vis-a-vis current consumption, compared to the case where the immediate return is independent of the stock. 
a' Taking the liminf as t + 00 on both sides of (5.2), noting that xt 0 and Re(gt,it)/Rc(ct±i t+1)' 1, we obtain a 1, which is a contradiction.
In the second subcase limsupx40 Rc(f(x)-x,f(x)) = + 00 and a = 6r(0) since Ry is bounded above. Under T.3 there exists > 0 such that ofi(x) > 1 for all x E (0,1). Choose yo close enough to 0 such that x = f 1(yo ) < . Since yt is strictly decreasing in t, it follows that xt < x for all t. Further, of( The first is the traditional case where the return function is independent of the stock. The second is when the stock effect valued in terms of the marginal return from consumption becomes negligible as consumption goes to zero. In either case it is an insignificant intrinsic welfare effect that results in (5-productivity as a condition for conservation. This provides a natural economic interpretation to (5-productivity that does not arise in the usual decentralized approach. Note that if Re(f(x)-x,f(x)) stays bounded above as x converges to zero, then global conservation can be optimal even if of(0) < 1, that is, even if the intrinsic growth rate of the resource is less than the discount rate.
It is worth pointing out that global conservation in the stock-independent case is typically established for interior optimal programs (an exception is Mitra and Ray (1984) who assume a unique nontrivial steady state). In characterizing possibilities for conservation and extinction it is especially important to consider noninterior actions as they may be more likely to lead to extinction. This is one strength of Theorem 5.1. Finally, it seems that Theorem 5.1 should extend to the case where a = 1, but 9This relies on the fact that yi = f( 0 ) < yp so that _c_Q
we have not been able to prove that. In the proof we proceed by taking limits on certain inequalities and there is no contradiction to a = 1. In case (b), one obtains a contradiction when x, < e, since Rc(f(x7)-x 7 ,f(x 7 .)) 0 implies c7+1 f(x,)-x".. // 10The proof of this theorem only requires that f is concave. However assumption (T.5) implies that in our framework, f can be concave only if 7 = 0, in which case it must be strictly concave. In models without stock dependence a necessary condition for global conservation is of (0) 1. conservation is efficient under weaker conditions than in models with stock-independent return. Even if the intrinsic growth rate of the resource is less than the discount rate, it may be optimal to conserve the species from all positive stock levels, provided the intrinsic welfare effect is strong enough. However, if the welfare effect becomes small as the stock converges to zero (either because the marginal utility of current consumption becomes unbounded relative to the marginal stock effect or because return function is independent of the stock), then the conditions for global conservation reduce to of (0) > 1. When the return function is not necessarily supermodular the welfare effect is still important provided f is strictly concave. Further, even in the general case our results encompass the 6-productivity at zero requirement used to ensure the efficiency of global conservation in stock-independent models.
5.ii Global

The Possibility of Extinction
In this section, we analyze situations under which it may be optimal to consume the resource to extinction. If the immediate return is independent of the stock then it is known that br(0) < 1 implies extinction is optimal from stocks close to zero. Further, global extinction is optimal if the technology is nowhere 6-productive (see Dechert and Nishimura (1983) ). In the previous two sections we have seen that the introduction of a stock-dependent return function increases the class of environments and discount factors for which conservation is efficient. It follows that stronger conditions should be required to obtain extinction as an efficient outcome when returns are stock-dependent.
Establishing the optimality of extinction under a reasonable set of general conditions turns out to be quite difficult when the optimal policy can exhibit non-monotonic behavior. As our purpose is to show how the conditions for extinction are modified by stock-dependent returns, we restrict our analysis to the supermodular case where optimal stock programs are monotonic over time. In this case, global extinction can only be an efficient outcome if there does not exist a strictly positive steady state. This is in accordance with our general claim that stock-dependence of the return function (for the supermodular case) makes the sufficient condition for conservation weaker and that for global extinction stronger.
There is also a larger class of situations where extinction is an efficient outcome only if the stock is sufficiently small. The next theorem characterizes some of these situations. Recall the definition of a from Section 5.i where it was shown that global conservation is optimal (that is extinction is never optimal from any strictly positive stock) if a > 1. Our condition for extinction from small stocks is close to a negation of this condition. Hence, there exists some z > 0, such that for all x E (0,z)
Suppose the theorem is not true. Then, by the monotonicity of optimal programs it must be that extinction never occurs from any yo > 0 and optimal stocks from all positive initial stocks must converge to a strictly positive steady state. For yo E (0,z), optimal stocks must be strictly increasing so long as yt < z because from (6.1) no steady state lies in (0,z). Let yo be any stock small enough such that if {yt} is the optimal program from yo, then yo < yi < z. Consider any y E [y0,y1]. We claim that c* = inf{C(y):
y G [yo,yi ]} > 0. Suppose the contrary. Then, there exists a sequence {yn} such that {yn-X(yn)} --> 0.
Since {yn} and {TC(yri)} are bounded there is subsequence {n'} of {n} such that {yn '} and {-1(yn')} converge to, say, y+ E [yo,yi]. Taking limits in the optimality equation V(yn') = W y n'
..y(y n'), yn ' ) oV(f(TC(yn'))) as n' --> + 00, we obtain V(y+) = R(0,y+ ) + 6V(f(y+)). This contradicts the fact that the right hand side of the optimality equation has an interior solution. Thus, c* > 0.
Define G = sup{Re(c*,y): yo y yi}. Then, 0 < G < +0° and for all y E [yo,yi}, Rc(c,y) Re(c*,y) G, where, cE C(y). Next we claim that there exists y' < yo such that Rc(c',y') > G, (6.3) for all c' E C(y'). To see this note that the optimal stock sequence from y' is increasing over time so that c'E C(y') y'-f 1(y') and Re(c',y') Rc(y'-f 1(y'),y')--> +00 as y' 0. Therefore, (6.3) must hold for some y' small enough. In (6.5) the last inequality follows from (6.2) and xt ' yi < z, for t T; and the first inequality uses the definition of MO and the fact that Rc(ct±i',Yt +1') = Rc(f(xt')-xt+i',f(xt')) Rc(f(xt')-x' ,f(xt')) since xt+1 ' xt ' and R is concave. By applying (6.5) recursively and then using (6.3), one obtains Rc(crr', yr') > T-1') > Rc(co',3/0') G, which contradicts (6.4) . // This result says that if the intrinsic welfare effect is zero and if the intrinsic growth rate of the resource is sufficiently low, then from small stock levels it is efficient to harvest the resource to extinction. Here, the intrinsic welfare effect becomes insignificant because the marginal value of sustainable consumption grows arbitrarily large as the stock becomes smaller, i.e., Rc(f(x)-x,f(x)) ---> + 00 as x4,0. This is a strong assumption; however, even in a framework where return is independent of the stock, the proof of the possibility of efficient extinction uses the fact that the marginal utility of consumption is infinite at zero (see, for example, Dechert and Nishimura (1983) ).
Conclusions
This paper has derived conditions under which a dynamically efficient management policy leads to conservation or extinction of a renewable resource. Three potential extensions are worth noting. First, our proof of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 are based on the convex hull of the technology. This implies that we lose information about the non-convex section. As a consequence it may be possible to strengthen these results. Second, we do not consider the efficiency of extinction when optimal resource stocks behave nonmonotonically over time. Third, the analysis is entirely in a deterministic setting. The existing literature on stochastic resource models with stock-dependent returns focusses on issues other than conservation and extinction, and assumptions are normally imposed that insure global conservation (e.g., Mendelssohn and Sobel (1981) , Olson (1991, 1994) ). Recently, however, there has been an interest in extinction and survival in stochastic models where utility depends only on consumption (e.g., Mitra and Roy (1993) ). Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the problem of conservation or extinction of optimally managed resources when there is uncertainty over resource productivity. 
